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UTAH R. APP, P. 2 4 ( A ) ( 1 ) STATEMENT OF ALL PARTIES T O THE FEDERAL
DISTRICT COURT & 10™ CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEAL PROCEEDINGS

1.

Plaintiffs Timothy A. Tabor and Debra J. Tabor;

2.

Plaintiff Farmers Insurance Company;

3.

Defendant The Metal Ware Corporation, a Wisconsin corporation;

4.

Defendant Nesco/American Harvest Corp., a Wisconsin corporation;

5.

Defendant Newco of Two Rivers, Inc., a Wisconsin corporation;

6.

Defendant Uvalko Shopko Stores, Inc., a Minnesota corporation; and

7.

Defendant Englewood Appliance Co., Inc., a Wisconsin Corporation.
Defendants Uvalko Shopko Stores, Inc. and Englewood Appliance

Company, Inc., settled out of this matter and were dismissed from the litigation by
the United States District Court, District of Utah, Judge Tena J. Campbell, on July
22, 2004. See R. at Farmers5 Fed. App. 24 (Federal District Court Docket entry
No. 147 (July 22, 2004).

i

TABLE OF CONTENTS

UTAH R. APP. P. 24(a)(1) STATEMENT OF ALL
PARTIES TO THE FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT
& 10™ CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEAL PROCEEDINGS

i

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ii-iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

iv-vi

CASE LAW

iv

STATUTES & RULES

vi

TREATISES

vi

I. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

1

II. ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW & STANDARD OF REVIEW

1

III. PRESERVATION OF ISSUES IN TRIAL COURT

2

IV. DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES,
ORDINANCES, RULES & REGULATIONS
2
V. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

2

A.

NATURE OF THE CASE

2

B.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW & DISPOSITION

4

VI. STATEMENT OF FACTS

7

VII. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

16

VIII. ARGUMENT

17

A. EXCEPTIONS TO THE GENERAL RULE OF
ii

SUCCESSOR NON-LIABILITLY APPLY
UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE

17

1. TRADITIONAL EXCEPTIONS TO SUCCESSOR
NON-LIABILITY APPLY

17

2. PRODUCT LINE AND CONTINUITY OF
ENTERPRISE EXCEPTIONS
a. PRODUCT LINE EXCEPTION

18
18

b. CONTINUITY OF ENTERPRISE EXCEPTION
21
c. FACTS SUPPORTING MERE CONTINUATION, PRODUCT
LINE AND CONTINUITY OF ENTERPRISE THEORIES OF
LIABILITY
21
B. UTAH LAW IMPOSES UPON SUCCESSOR
CORPORATIONS A POST-SALE DUTY TO WARN
OF PRODUCT DEFECTS IN A PREDECESSOR'S
MANUFACTURED PRODUCTS

24

1. FACTORS RELEVANT TO DETERMINING WFIETHER
METAL WARE DISCHARGED ITS DUTY TO WARN

29

IX. CONCLUSION

36

X. STATEMENT IN SUPPORT OF ORAL ARGUMENT

37

XL ADDENDUM NOT NECESSARY

37

XII. JOINDER IN TABORS' APPELLATE BRIEF

38

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

39

in

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASE LAW
PAGE(S)
Andrews v. JohnE. Smith's Sons Co., 369 So. 2d 781 (Ala. 1979)

19

Burton v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 397 F.3d 906 (10th Cir. 2005)

33

Case v. Paul Troester Maschinenfabrik, 139 F. Supp. 2d 428
(W.D.N.Y. 2001)

17,19

Colegrove v. Cameron Machine Co., 172 F. Supp. 2d 611 (W.D. Pa. 2001)

32

Darrylv. Ford Motor Co., 440 S.W.2d 630 (Tex. 1969)

31

Decius v. Action Collection Serv., 2004 UT App. 484, 105 P.3d 956
(Utah Ct. App.)

2, 20, 32

Eckv. Parke, Davis & Co., 256 F.3d 1013 (10th Cir. 2001)

33

Ernest v. Hahn, Inc. v. Armco Steel Co., 601 P.2d 152 (Utah 1979)
Florom v. Elliott Mfg., 867 F.2d 570 (10th Cir. 1989)

25, 27
17, 25, 26

Florom v. Elliott Mfg., 879 F.2d 801 (10th Cir. 1989) (per curiam)

26

Freeman v. United Cities propane Gas, 807 F. Supp. 1533 (M.D. Ga.
1992)

30,31

Garcia v. Coe, 933 P.2d 243 (N.M. 1997)

17, 20, 21, 26, 29, 30

Gee v. Tenneco, Inc., 615 F.2d 857, 866 (9th Cir. 1980)

26

George v. Parke-Davis, 733 P.2d 507 (Wash. 1987)

19

Hinerv. Deere & Co., 340 P.2d 1191 (10th Cir. 2003)

31

IV

House v. Armour of America, Inc., 886 P.2d 542 (Utah Ct. App.
1994)

25,27,29,32

House v. Armour of America, Inc., 929 P.2d 340 (Utah 1996)

25, 33, 34

J.F. Anderson Lumber v. Myers, 206N.W.2d365 (Minn. 1973)

17

Khanv. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 711 S.W.2d 310 (Tex. App. 1986)
Macris & Assocs., Inc. v. Neways, Inc., 986 P.2d 748 (Utah Ct. App. 1999),
affd 16 P.3d 1214 (Utah 2000)

31

Nieves v. Bruno Sherman Corp., 431 A.2d 826 (N.J. 1981)

19

17

Nissen Trampoline Co. v. Terre Haute First Nat'I Bank, 332 N.E.2d 820,
(Ind. Ct. App. 1975), rev'd on procedural grounds 358 N.E.2d 947 (1976)
Ray v. Alad Corp., 560 P.2d 3 (Cal 1977)

32
19, 20

Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories, 498 F.2d 1264, 1276 (5th Cir.),
cert, denied, 419 U.S. 1096, 95 S. Ct. 687, 42 L.Ed.2d 688 (1974)

30

Richterv. Limaxlnt'l, Inc., 45 F.3d 1464 (10th Cir. 1995)

33

Schumacher v. Richards Shear Co., 451 N.E.2d 194 (N.Y. 1983)

26

Slisze v. Stanley-Bostitch, 979 P.2d 317 (Utah 1999)

25

Stuckeyv. Northern Propane Gas Co., 874 F.2d 1563, 1568 (11th Cir.1989)

30

Tenbarge v. Ames Taping Tool Sys., Inc., 190 F.3d 862 (10th Cir. 1999)
Travis v. Harris Corp., 565 F.2d 443 (7th Cir. 1977)

33, 34
26,29,30

Turner v. Bituminous Cas. Co., 244 N. W.2d 873 (Mich. 1976)
U.S. Silica Co. v. Tompkins, 92 S. W.3d 605 (Tex. Ct. App. 2002)
Veloso v. Western Bedding Supply Co., 281 F. Supp. 2d 743 (D. NJ. 2003)

21
32
32

Walker v. Merck & Co., 648 F. Supp. 931 (M.D. Ga. 1986)

30

STATUTES & RULES
PAGE(S)
10th Cir. Civ. R.27.1

1

Utah Code Ann. §78-15-6

25,27

Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2

1

UtahR.App.P.24(a)(ll)

37

Utah R. App. P. 24(i)

37

Utah R. App. P. 41

1

TREATISES
1 Timothy Travers et ah, American Law of Products Liability § 7:20
(3rd ed. 1994)

20,21

63 Am. Jur. 2d Products Liability § 133 (1996)

19, 21

L.R. Fumer, M.I. Friedman, Products Liability, § 2.06 (1988)

26

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A

25, 27

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A, comment (j)

33, 34

VI

I.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code

Ann. § 78-2-2, which extends this Court's jurisdiction "to answer questions of state
tit

law certified by a court of the United States." See also 10 Cir. Civ. R. 27.1 and Utah
R. App.P. 41.
II.

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW & STANDARD OF REVIEW
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit certified these issues:
A.

Does Utah law recognize an exception to the general rule of successor

non-liability under the circumstances of this case?
B.

Does Utah law impose on successor corporations a post-sale duty to

independently warn customers of defects in products manufactured and sold by the
predecessor corporation? If so, what factors should determine whether a successor has
discharged that duty?
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit made no ruling on
these issues, but rather has certified them to the Utah Supreme Court for decision.
Accordingly, the resolution of these issues is before the Utah Supreme Court in the
first instance and there is no applicable standard of appellate review. However, insofar
as the Utah Supreme Court endeavors to review the United States' District Court's
rulings on these issues {see Record, Appellant Farmers Insurance Company's
1

Appendix (hereinafter "Farmers' Fed. App.") at 53-68 & 69-76), the standard of
review of a trial court's summary judgment determinations is de novo, for correctness.
Decius v. Action Collections Service, Inc, 2004 UT App. 484, 105 P.3d 956, 958 f7
(Utah Ct. App.).
III.

PRESERVATION OF ISSUES IN TRIAL COURT
These issues were presented to the United States District Court, District or Utah,

and were ruled upon by the Honorable Tena Campbell. See Farmer's Fed. App. at 6266, 71-76, 203-04, & 247-63.
IV.

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES,
ORDINANCES, RULES & REGULATIONS
There are no determinative constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules

or regulations.
V.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

NATURE OF THE CASE

In this products liability action, a food dehydrator manufactured by American
Harvest and purchased by Tim and Debra Tabor caused a fire and significant damage
in the Tabors' home. Thereafter, pursuant to an insurance contract, Appellant Farmers
paid approximately $255,186.57 to or on behalf of the Tabors.
On August 17,1995, the United States Consumer Product Safety Commission

2

(hereinafter "USCPSC") announced a recall of 56,843 of American Harvest's food
dehydrators because the "heating element in the food dehydrators can overheat,
presenting a fire hazard." The USCPSC imposed a continuing obligation on American
Harvest to report any "information concerning other incidents or injuries, or
information that affects the scope, prevalence or seriousness of the defect or hazard."
Without knowledge of the recall, the Tabors purchased an American Harvest
food dehydrator from a Utah Shopko store in the spring of 1996.
On April 2, 1997 American Harvest and Metal Ware, through a shell company
named Newco, entered into an Asset Purchase Agreement whereby Metal Ware
intended to purchase American Harvest's assets, but not its liabilities. Metal Ware
retained key American Harvest employees, honored all American Harvest service
contracts, maintained use of the American Harvest name and its customer service
telephone number, and maintained relationships with American Harvest's customers.
In December 1997, nearly a year prior to the November 1998 fire that destroyed
the Tabors' home, Metal Ware received notice of a defective FD-50 food dehydrator
that caused a fire in an Oklahoma residence. Metal Ware made no effort to warn the
Tabors, either directly or indirectly, of the ongoing safety danger presented by the
product line it acquired from American Harvest. Thereafter, a fire caused by the
Tabors' defective American Harvest dehydrator destroyed the Tabors' home and its

3

contents.
B.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW & DISPOSITION

On June 29,1999, Plaintiffs Tim and Debra Tabor filed their Complaint in the
underlying case, number 2:99-cv-00503. On November 16, 2000, Farmers filed its
subrogation action in case number 2:00-cv-898, which arose out of the same set of
facts as the Tabors' action. On January 23, 2002, the Tabors filed a motion to
consolidate case number 2:99-cv-00503 with Farmers' case number 2.-OO-cv-898. On
October 15,2002, the trial court granted the motion to consolidate the two cases, and
the matter proceeded under case number 2:99-cv-00503. On October 29, 2002,
Plaintiff Farmers filed its Third Amended Complaint. See R. at Farmers' Fed. App.
27-38.
On March 8, 2002, Metal Ware filed its first motion for summary judgment
seeking dismissal of all causes of action based on Metal Ware's April 2, 1997 Asset
Purchase Agreement with American Harvest and contending the following clause
absolved Metal Ware of any liability arising out of the 1998 Tabor fire:
Purchaser [Metal Ware] shall not assume or become liable for any
contracts, obligations or liabilities of seller (including, but not limited to,
accounts payable, payroll, accrued liabilities, bank debt, loans payable,
product liability, warranty liability or any tax liability) and seller
[American Harvest] shall indemnify and hold purchaser harmless from
any liability arising out of any such contract, obligations or liabilities —

4

On October 15, 2002, the trial court denied Metal Ware's first motion for summary
judgment, without prejudice, to permit further discovery. See R. at Farmers' Fed. App.
52.
On January 15, 2003, Metal Ware filed its second motion for summary
judgment, arguing that all claims against Metal Ware fail based on the foregoing no
assumption of liabilities clause in the 1997 Asset Purchase Agreement. On September
8,2003, the trial court granted in part and denied in part Metal Ware's second motion
for summary judgment. The trial court refused to recognize the product line or
continuity of enterprise theories of successor liability under Utah law and, thus,
dismissed all claims under a product distribution theory and pursuant to the general
rule of non-liability for a successor corporation. However, the trial court denied Metal
Ware's motion to the extent the plaintiffs asserted a duty to warn. See R. at Farmers'
Fed. App. 53-68.
On December 1,2003, Metal Ware filed its third motion for summary judgment,
this time challenging the duty to warn theory based on the plaintiffs' purported failure
to plead a duty to warn in their respective complaints, and based on Metal Ware's
assertion it had no knowledge of and therefore ability to warn the Tabors. On April 26,
2004, the trial court denied Metal Ware's third motion for summary judgment because
the plaintiffs had specifically and sufficiently pled a duty to warn theory of liability. In
5

addition, the court held that "Utah law would impose a duty to warn on a successor
corporation" and, based on the facts of this case, determined that Metal Ware had a
duty to warn. See R. at Farmers' Fed. App. 69-76 (emphasis added).
On June 9,2004, the trial court entered its final Trial Order setting the matter for
a four-day jury trial on July 12, 2004, which date was later vacated. R. at Farmers'
Fed. App. 77-82.
On June 24, 2004, Metal Ware filed its fourth motion for summary judgment,
also on the duty to warn issue, again alleging it had no duty to warn and could not be
held liable on a failure to warn theory because it had no knowledge of the Tabors. The
trial court summarily denied Metal Ware's fourth summary judgment motion by its
Order of July 9, 2004. See R. at Farmers' Fed. App. 83.
On December 9,2004, Metal Ware filed its fifth motion for summary judgment,
this time on the issue of causation arguing the testimony of Shopko's director of
vendor compliance was insufficient to establish causation—namely that a warning to
Shopko would have prevented the subject fire in the Tabors' home. See R. at Farmers'
Fed. App. 218-223.

The Tabors and Farmers countered arguing the Shopko

representative's testimony demonstrated a warning to the retail store would have
resulted in warnings to the general public that would have put the Tabors on notice of
the product defect. SeeR. at Farmers' Fed. App. 86-113,155-60,203-05. On May 20,
6

2005, the trial court granted Metal Ware's motion for summary judgment on causation.
In doing so, the trial court opined that the Shopko representative was unable to
conclusively testify what the store would have done had it received a warning from
Metal Ware. Based on this interpretation of the Shopko representative's testimony, the
trial court dismissed the last remaining cause of action against Metal Ware and entered
its May 20, 2005 Judgment in a Civil Case. See R. at Farmers' Fed. App. 116-124.
Thereafter, Farmers and the Tabors appealed to the United States Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals, which heard argument on May 8,2006 and subsequently issued its
Certification of Questions of State Law to the Utah Supreme Court on May 26,2006.
VI.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

On or about August 17,1995, the United States Consumer Product Safety

Commission (hereinafter "USCPSC") announced a recall of 56,843 food dehydrators
because the "heating element in the food dehydrators can overheat, presenting a fire
hazard." See R. at Farmers' Fed. App. 355-57 (WI 0259 to WI 0260).
2.

Without knowledge of the recall, the Tabors purchased an American

Harvest dehydrator from a Utah Shopko store in the spring of 1996. See R. at Farmers'
Fed. App. 54.
3.

According to Metal Ware, Metal Ware formed Newco in order to

purchase the assets of American Harvest. Subsequent to the transaction, Newco
7

merged with its parent corporation, Metal Ware, and ceased to exist. See R. at Tabors'
Fed. App. 489-490 (Drumm Depo. at 17:9 to 18:12).
4.

Metal Ware's primary objective in purchasing the assets of American

Harvest was to secure the right to manufacture and sell the American Harvest line of
food dehydrators. See R. at Tabors' Fed. App. 511-12 (Drumm Depo. at 105:24 to
106:3).
5.

Prior to Metal Ware's purchase of American Harvest's assets, Metal

Ware's President, Wesley C. Drumm, was well-aware of the USCPSC recall involving
the American Harvest food dehydrators which Metal Ware specifically sought to
manufacture and sell. See R. at Farmers' Fed. App. 268-76 (Drumm Depo. at 40:1521, 42:7-22, 43:5-21, 49:9-13, 71:16-22, 86:15-21, and 106:4-6).
6.

On April 3, 1997, a Metal Ware press release announced (1) the

acquisition of American Harvest's assets, (2) Metal Ware had "retained many of the
key employees" of American Harvest, (3) the companies had "distribution channels
that are almost identical", and (4) American Harvest's founders, David Dornbush and
Chad Erickson, would be continuing with Metal Ware. See R. at Farmers' Fed. App.
278-79.
7.

Despite Metal Ware's knowledge of the USCPSC recall and its hiring of

American Harvest's key employees, Metal Ware did nothing to follow-up on the recall
8

and/or to warn consumers of the dangers of the defective product placed into the
stream of commerce by its predecessor. See R. at Farmers' Fed. App. 268-76 (Drumm
Depo. at 40:22-25,41:1-7,44:8-14,44:23 to45:12,49:1-8,72:12to 73:10, and 88:21
to 89:20).
8.

One concern during the negotiation of the April 2,1997 Asset Purchase

Agreement was that Metal Ware "did not want to be liable for any past sins" of
American Harvest, including avoiding "the trailings of product liability." See R. at
Tabors' Fed. App. 474 (Erickson Depo. at 21:13-25), and R. at Tabors' Fed. App. 457
(Dornbush Depo. at 41:7-17).
9.

Metal Ware's President testified of his long-term association with

American Harvest's product distributor, Englewood, his personal relationship with
principals thereof, and his knowledge of Englewood's ongoing distributor relationship
with Shopko. See R. at Farmers' Fed. App. 274 (Drumm Depo. at 94:22 to 96:10).
10.

In order to sell its dehydrators, Metal Ware used many of the same

distributors originally used by American Harvest prior to the purchase of assets. See
R. at Farmers' Fed. App. 276 (Drumm Depo. at 118:24 to 119:2).
11.

In fact, Englewood remained one of Metal Ware's top customers, and

from June through December 1997 alone, Englewood sold $645,744.60 worth of Metal
Ware merchandise. See R. at Farmers' Fed. App. 281 (WI 0989, TOPSLS.XLS
9

Top7mo~Table showing Englewood as third highest seller of Metal Ware products);
id. at 283-286 (WI0884 to WI0888,1997 Sales Report); seealsoid. at296(WI0140,
Facsimile to Metal Ware (Aug. 24, 1998) (announcing dehydrator orders for
Englewood/Shopko)).

In 1998, Englewood sold $359,983.20 in Metal Ware

merchandise. See R. at Farmers' Fed. App. 289-93 (WI 0868 to WI 0873,1998 Sales
Report). By comparison, the year prior to Metal Ware's acquisition of the American
Harvest assets, Englewood generated $592,200.00 in FD-50 dehydrator gross sales.
SeeR. at Farmers' Fed. App. 298 (WI 0350, 1996 Gross Sales Report).
12.

On April 10, 1997, former American Harvest vice president Steve

Twedell wrote to American Harvest's toll-free telephone service provider to inform
that "NESCO/American Harvest Corp.1 is interested in utilizing the '800' numbers
previously used by American Harvest, Inc. without interruption." See R. at Farmers'
Fed. App. 300 (WI 1273, Twedell letter to AT&T Account Executive Deborah Smith
(Apr. 10,1997)). Metal Ware's president, Wesley C.Drumm, was provided a courtesy
copy of this correspondence. See id.
13.

Following Metal Ware's asset purchase, it sent a letter to prior American

Harvest retailers announcing that Metal Ware "will soon begin filling your product
needs with the American Harvest ® brand of the finest in Electric Dehydrators and

1

Nesco/American Harvest is the brand named used by Metal Ware.
10

Accessories." See R. at Farmers' Fed. App. 306 (WI 1008, Anderson Letter to
Retailers (attached as Ex. 11)).
14.

On July 1, 1997, operating under the name Nesco/American Harvest

Corp., Metal Ware sent American Harvest's former service center representatives a
letter advising that "[warranties for all products produced by American Harvest will
be honored" by Nesco/American Harvest. See R. at Farmers' Fed. App. 308 (WI
0376, Bonheyo letter to Service Center Representatives).
15.

On August 25,1997, operating under the name Nesco/AmericanHarvest

Corp., Metal Ware sent a letter to retailers noting the new company "stands behind
their electrical appliances and will continue to process return authorization requests on
defective items from other NESCO/American Harvest product lines." See R. at
Farmers' Fed. App. 310 (WI 0993, Wendorff letter to Retailers (Aug. 25, 1997)).
16.

In December 1997, Metal Ware sent "to approximately 125 service

centers previously aligned with American Harvest," seeR. at Farmers' Fed. App. 322,
a domestic service center agreement under cover of a letter announcing Metal Ware's
procedure for handling all warranty and non-warranty repairs of American Harvest
products including all model FD-30/50 food dehydrators. See R. at Farmers' Fed.
App. 312-22 (WI 0995 to WI 1005, Service Center Representative packet (Dec. 1,
1997)).
11

17.

In December 1997, thus nearly a year prior to the November 1998firethat

destroyed the Tabor's home, Metal Ware received notice of a defective FD-50 food
dehydrator unit that caused a fire in the home of an Oklahoma resident. See R. at
Farmers' Fed. App. 324 (WI 0019, Barton facsimile to Youngchild (Dec. 5, 1997)).
18.

At all times relevant hereto following the asset purchase agreement, Metal

Ware/Newco had in its possession correspondence between American Harvest's vice
president of engineering and the U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission
documenting the history of and basis for the FD-50 food dehydrator recall. See R. at
Farmers' Fed. App. 326-344 (WI 0146 to WI 0164, USCPSC Recall Information).
This correspondence included July 25, 1995 and February 23, 1996 letters from the
USCPSC, which imposed the affirmative duty to continue a corrective action program
and to report all "information concerning other incidents or injuries, or information that
affects the scope, prevalence or seriousness of the defect or hazard." See id. at 328
(WI 0148) & 331 (WI 0151).
19.

Also in Metal Ware's possession at all relevant times was the July 26,

1995 correspondence sent by American Harvest to Englewood warning of the defective
FD-50 food dehydrators. See R. at Farmers' Fed. App. 346-49 (WI 0397 to WI 0400,
Giambruno facsimile & letter to Lunderville (July 27, 1995)).
20.

Further, at all times relevant hereto, Metal Ware/Newco had in its
12

possession packets which were sent to American Harvest retailers of the FD-50 food
dehydrators describing the USCPSC consumer notification and remedial action plan
and advising of the means available to retailers to warn nonregistered consumers of
the products defects "with notices posted in retail stores and through the general media
via a press release." See R. at Farmers' Fed. App. 351-60 (WI 0255 to WI 0264,
American Harvest letter and information to Montgomery Ward (Aug. 16, 1995)).
21.

One such document within Metal Ware's possession explicitly spelled out

the means available to contact unknown consumers:
Non-registered Consumers
The only means available to usto contact non-registered consumers are
with notices posted in retail stores and through the general media via a
press release. Attached is the in-store notice that we would ask you to
post at your retail outlets. If you have any questions on where to post or
need additional copies, please do not hesitate to contact us.
Also attached is the text of the Press Release which is scheduled for
release on Thursday, August 17. This notice was prepared in conjunction
with the U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission. Please note: this
copy of the press release is CONFIDENTIAL and for your internal use
only. It must not be issued by any agency other than the U.S. Consumer
Product Safety Commission.
These actions may generate consumer inquiries to your stores. Please
instruct store personnel to request that theconsumers contact American
Harvest directly, through our published 800#, for guidance regarding the
inspection and repair of their dehydrators.
R. at Farmers' Fed. App. 353 (emphasis in original); see also R. at Farmers' Fed. App.
13

355-59 (documents referenced in Farmers' Fed. App. p.353).
22.

Despite Metal Ware's knowledge of the prior USCPSC recall and its

hiring of a number of key employees of American Harvest, despite Metal Ware's
exclusive control over all documentation outlining the recall procedure and how to
contact even non-registered customers, despite Metal Ware's commitment to repair the
defective products, and despite Metal Ware's ongoing stream of income from the
defective product line, once Metal Ware became aware of another dehydrator fire in
December 1997 it did nothing to follow-up on the recall and/or to warn consumers of
the ongoing dangers of the defective product. See R. at Farmers Fed. App. 253 at ffl[
20 & 22, id. at 269-71 (Drumm Depo. at 40:22-25, 41:1-7, 44:8-14, 44:23 to 45:12,
49:1-8), id. at 272 (Drumm Depo. at 72:12 to 73:10), and id. at 273 (Drumm Depo. at
88:21 to 89:20).
23.

Farmers' Third Amended Complaint alleged a general failure to warn,

which encompasses the duty of Metal Ware to warn the Tabors through any reasonable
means available. SeeR. atFarmers' Fed. App. 27-39(1^ 17,19,29,30,36,37,43,61,
62, 66, 73 & 74).
24.

The trial court held that Metal Ware, as a successor corporation, hadan

ongoing duty to warn consumers such as the Tabors of the defect or ongoing danger
presented by the FD-50 food dehydrator. See R. at Farmers' Fed. App. 73-76 & 83.
14

25.

The trial court also rejected Metal Ware's argument that it had no

knowledge of the identity of the Tabors and therefore no ability to personally warn
them. See R. at Farmers' Fed. App. 83 (denying Metal Ware's Fourth Motion for
Summary Judgment); see also R. at Farmers' Fed. App. 75-76 (recognizing means
available to Metal Ware to contact unknown members of the general public).
26.

Shopko's supervisor of vendor compliance, Shelley Schroeder, testified

that, had Shopko received notice from Metal Ware of a FD-50 food dehydrator defect
that caused a residential fire, it would have considered the matter a "severe" injury.
See R. at Farmers' Fed. App. 152 at f 8, and/d. at 178 (Schroeder Depo. at 50:3-7).
27.

Schroeder also testified that, had Shopko received notice from Metal

Ware, it would have followed its standard plan for dealing with a recalled product:
She would have met with corporate counsel to devise a plan of action, which would
include removing the product from Shopko shelves, and providing notice to members
of the general public by posting signs in the store at the point of sale and at the
customer service desk. SeeR. at Farmers' Fed. App. 100:15 to 105:25;R. at Farmers'
Fed. App. 152 ay f 8; R. at Farmers' Fed. App. 170 (Schroeder Depo. at 20:20 to
21:4); R. at Farmers' Fed. App. 176-77 (Schroeder Depo. at 42:11 to 46:25); R. at
Farmers' Fed. App. 177-78 (Schroeder Depo. at 49:15 to 51:1).
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VII. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Pursuant to Utah law, and under the facts of this case, Metal Ware was a mere
continuation of the selling corporation, American Harvest, and therefore should be
strictly liable in products liability under one of the four exceptions to the traditional
rule of successor corporation non-liability. Moreover, the Utah Supreme Court should
adopt both the product line and continuity of enterprise exceptions to the traditional
rule of successor non-liability under which Metal Ware is additionally strictly liable for
the defective product that burned the Tabors' home to the ground.
Further, a successor corporation, with knowledge of a product defect as Metal
Ware indisputably had in this matter, has an independent duty to warn consumers
regardless of the nature of the contractual relationship between the predecessor and
successor corporations. The burden of substantial consumer losses must be borne by
the entities generating profits off of the ongoing sales of products and the goodwill
established by predecessor corporations. The decision whether a successor corporation
has discharged its duty to warn should turn on the reasonableness of the successor
corporation's actions under the facts of the given case. In this instance, Metal Ware
made no duty to warn and was therefore negligent per se.
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VIII. ARGUMENT
A. EXCEPTIONS TO THE GENERAL RULE OF SUCCESSOR NON-LIABILITY APPLY
UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE
1. TRADITIONAL EXCEPTIONS TO SUCCESSOR NON-LIABILITY APPLY

Utah law recognizes, generally, that where a company purchases the assets of
another company, the purchasing company does not acquire the debts or liabilities of
the seller. Maoris & Assocs., Inc. v. Neways, Inc., 986 P.2d 748, 752 (Utah Ct. App.
1999),a#'dl6P.3d 1214 (Utah 2000); see also Florom v. ElliottMfg., 867F.2d570,
575 n.2 (10 Cir. 1989) ("[W]here one company sells or otherwise transfers all its
assets to another company the latter is not liable for the debts and liabilities of the
transferor."). However, Utah courts have recognized four exceptions to this general
rule where:"(1) the purchaser expressly or impliedly agrees to assume such debts; (2)
the transaction amounts to a consolidation or merger of the seller and purchaser; (3) the
purchasing corporation is merely a continuation of the selling corporation; or (4)he
transaction is entered fraudulently in order to escape liability for such debts." 986 P.2d
at 752 (citing Florom, 867 F.2d at 575 n.2); see also Case v. Paul Troester
Maschinenfabrik 139F. Supp.2d428,430(W.D.N.Y. 2001); Garciav. Coe,933 P.2d
243,247 (N.M. 1997); and/.F. Anderson Lumber v. Myers, 206 N.W.2d 365,368-69
(Minn. 1973).
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In this case, the facts support a finding that Metal Ware was merely a
continuation of the selling corporation. Metal Ware purchased American Harvest to
obtain the American Harvest name and dehydrator product line and to take advantage
of American Harvest's goodwill and name recognition. Metal Ware continued to
employ American Harvest's founders and its key personnel, sold the identical product
under the very same American Harvest name, utilized the same tool free customer
service number as American Harvest, entered service contracts with American
Harvest's service providers, and honored all of American Harvest's warranties.
Meanwhile, after the asset purchase, American Harvest ceased to exist leaving persons
such as the Tabors with no remedy in products liability absent the successor
corporation's liability.
2. PRODUCT LINE AND CONTINUITY OF ENTERPRISE EXCEPTIONS

The undisputed testimonies of Metal Ware's president and corporate secretary,
Wesley Drumm and Linda Youngchild, respectively, provide unequivocal evidence
satisfyingthe "product line" and "continuity of enterprise" exceptions to the traditional
rule of successor non-liability.
a.

PRODUCT LINE EXCEPTION

Under the product line exception, where a purchasing entity buys all or
substantially all of the assets of a selling entity and continues essentially the same
18

operation as the selling corporation, the purchasing entity remains strictly liable for
injuries caused by a defective product of the same product line, even if the defective
product was manufactured and distributed by the selling entity or its predecessor. See
63 Am. Jur. 2d Products Liability § 133 (1996); see also, e.g., Case, 139F. Supp. 2d at
434; Andrews v. JohnE. Smith's Sons Co.,369 So. 2d 781,785-86 (Ala. 1979); Nieves
v. Bruno Sherman Corp., 431 A.2d 826, 830-31 (N.J. 1981); Ray v. Alad Corp., 560
P.2d 3 (Cal 1977). Under this theory, the successor retains product liability after an
asset purchase where the successor (1) acquires substantially all the assets of the
predecessor, (2) continues to distribute the product under the same or similar name,
and (3) continues to hold itself out as a continuation of the predecessor, benefiting
from the predecessor's goodwill. 63 Am. Jur. 2d Products Liability § 133 (1996);
Nieves, 431 A.2d at 830-31; Ray, 560 P.2d at 8-10; George v. Parke-Davis, 733 P.2d
507, 510 (Wash. 1987); Case, 139 F. Supp. 2d at 434 ("This exceptionprovides that
' when a corporation buys substantially all of the assets of a corporate manufacturer and
thereafter continues essentially the same manufacturing operation it may be strictly
liable for defects in products in the same line even though they were in factnade by
the predecessor.").
Alternatively stated, the product line exception "'seeks to establish whether there
is a substantial continuity in the products resulting from the pretransaction and
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posttransactionuse of the predecessor's assets.'" Garcia, 933 P.2d at 247 (emphasis in
original) (quoting 1 Timothy E. Travers et al, American Law of Products Liability
§7:20 at 37 (3r ed. 1994)). In Garcia, the court adopted the product line exception in
order to protect "an injured person who may be left without a remedy if the
predecessor has dissolved, is defunct, or is otherwise unavailable to respond in
damages." 933 P.2d at 247. Finally, three additional reasons weigh in favor of the
product-line exception:
First, the buyer company is in a better position to bear the expense of the
injury that the victim. Second, a manufacturer buyer is able to spread the
cost of the injury to future consumers. And third, because a manufacturer
buyer profits from the predecessor's goodwill and reputation, it is unfair
to allow the buyer to succeed to the seller purposes of sales but not
liability.
Decius, 2004 UT App. 484,105 P.3d at 960114; see also Ray, 560 P.2d at 9 (citing as
basis for successor liability: (1) unavailability of remedy to plaintiff, (2) successor
knowledge of risk to consumer, and (3) predecessor's goodwill enhanced sales of
successor). Indeed, "[b]ecause 'strict liability focuses on the product,' and not on
conduct, it is not unfair to assess liability to successor manufacturers who have
purchased the right to benefit from selling and servicing the product." Garcia, 933
P.2d at 249-50 (citation omitted).
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b.

CONTINUITY OF ENTERPRISE EXCEPTION

Under the continuity of enterprise exception, a successor corporation retains
liability for injuries caused by its predecessor's products where the totality of the
transaction between the successor and predecessor demonstrates a basic continuity of
enterprise. See 63 Am. Jur. 2d Products Liability § 133 (1996); see also Garcia, 933
P.2d at 247; Turner v. Bituminous Cas. Co,, 244 N.W.2d 873, 875, 877-84 (Mich.
1976). Thus, the "' continuation of enterprise analysis seeks to establish whether there
is a substantial continuity of pretransaction and posttransaction business activities
resulting from the use of the acquired assets.'5' Garcia, 933 P.2d at 247 (quoting 1
Timothy E. Travers et al, American Law of Products Liability §7:20 at 37 (3rd ed.
1994)). Factors used to evaluate whether the circumstances evidence a continuity of
enterprise include (1) whether the successor corporation is a continuation of assets,
management and general business operations; (2) whether the selling corporation
dissolves shortly after the transfer of assets; and (3) whether the successor corporation
holds itself out as a continuation of the previous enterprise. See 63 Am. Jur. 2d
Products Liability § 133 (\996)\see also Turner, 244 N.W.2d at 883-84.
c.

FACTS SUPPORTING MERE CONTINUATION, PRODUCT LINE AND
CONTINUITY OF ENTERPRISE THEORIES OF LIABILITY

Metal Ware's president and corporate secretary provided abundant testimony
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supporting several exceptions to the traditional rule of non-liability of successor
corporations. American Harvest sold its assets to Metal Ware's shell company, Newco
of Two Rivers, Inc. See R. at Tabors' Fed. App. 489 (Drumm Depo. at 17:7-23).
Newco existed solely to acquire the assets of American Harvest, and after it acquired
the assets it even changed its name to American Harvest. See id. at 489-90 (Drumm
Depo. at 17:24-18:24& 19:5 to21:12). This new American Harvest entity was created
as a subsidiary of Metal Ware, and it only existed for a few weeks until it merged with
Metal Ware shortly after the transaction. See id. at 490-91 (Drumm Depo. at 21:19 to
22:15). Moreover, Wesley Drumm, the president of Metal Ware, was also the
president of Newco during its short existence prior to Newco adopting the American
Harvest name and its merger with Metal Ware. See id. at 489-90 (Drumm Depo. at
17:13 to 18:24). American Harvest went bankrupt within a week of the April 1997
asset purchase. See id. at 506 (Drumm Depo. at 83:13-20). Prior to the asset purchase,
Metal Ware's president was aware of the USCPSC recall. See R. at Tabors' Fed. App.
512 (Drumm Depo. at 106:4-16).
Metal Ware intended to purchase American Harvest's assets and continue
manufacturing and selling the American Harvest food dehydrators under the American
Harvest brand name. See id. at 494 (Drumm Depo. at 34:7-23), 500 (Drumm Depo. at
61:13-22), 506 (Drumm Depo. at 82:15 to 83:12), 511-12 (Drumm Depo. at 105:24 to
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106:3). Metal Ware, which prior to the asset purchase did not manufacture or sell
dehydrators, wanted to acquire the American Harvest food dehydrator line because
American Harvest food dehydrators enjoyed considerable name recognition in the
market. See id. at 495-96 (Drumm Depo. at 41:25 to 42:3), 510 (Drumm Depo. at
101:14-22), 513 (Drumm Depo. at 113:16-21). Metal Ware retained many of
American Harvest's key employees, the companies had nearly identical distribution
channels, and American Harvest's founders, David Dornbush and Chad Erickson,
continued on with Metal Ware. See R. at Farmers' Fed. App. 278-79; see also R. at
Tabors' Fed. App. 508 (Drumm Depo. at 91:22 to 92:23) and 511 (Drumm Depo. at
102:23 to 103:20). After the asset purchase, Metal Ware sent numerous letters to
American Harvest's former customers, retailers, distributors, and service centers
indicating Metal Ware's intent to honor the warrantied and nonwarrantied repairs of
American Harvest dehydrators. SeeR. at Farmers' Fed. App. 308 (WI 0376, Bonheyo
letter to Service Center Representatives), id. at 310 (WI 0993, Wendorff letter to
Retailers), and id. 312-22 (WI 0995 to WI 1005, Service Center Representative
packet).
Since the asset purchase, Metal Ware has presented itself as American Harvest
in the marketplace, has sold food dehydrators under the American Harvest trademark
and enjoys the benefits of American Harvest's goodwill. See R. at Tabors' Fed. App.
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508 (Drumm Depo. at 92:20 to 93:9), 511 (Drumm Depo. at 105:6-19); see also R. at
Farmers' Fed. App. 302 (Youngchild Depo. at 16:14 to 17:21). Following the asset
purchase, Metal Ware continued to derive revenue from sales of American Harvest
products manufactured prior to the asset purchase. See R. at Tabors' Fed. App. 513
(Drumm Depo. at 111:16-21).
In short, under the mere continuation, product line and continuity of enterprise
exceptions to the traditional rule of successor non-liability, there is substantial evidence
demonstrating Metal Ware should retain strict liability for this dangerous product,
which Metal Ware knew to have been defective, even if the product was manufactured
and sold by American Harvest. At the time of the asset purchase, which left American
Harvest bankrupt, Metal Ware intended, and to this date continues, to sell the same line
of food dehydrators under the American Harvest name. Inasmuch as American
Harvest went bankrupt immediately following the asset purchase, the Tabors and
Farmers are left without a remedy if Metal Ware is permitted to escape strict products
liability despite its full knowledge of the problems assocated with the dehydrators.
B. UTAH LAW IMPOSES UPON SUCCESSOR CORPORATIONS A POST-SALE DUTY
TO WARN OF PRODUCT DEFECTS IN A PREDECESSOR'S MANUFACTURED
PRODUCTS

The United States District Court previously held that Utah law would recognize
a successor corporation's independent duty to warn, and specifically held that Metal
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Ware had an independent duty to warn under the facts and circumstances of this case.
See R. at Farmers' Fed. App. pp.72-76. In doing so, the court looked to the
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402 A, which Utah has adopted. See House v. Armour
of America, Inc., 929 P.2d 340,343 (Utah 1996); Ernest W. Hahn, Inc. v. Armco Steel
Co., 601 P.2d 152, 156-58 (Utah 1979) (adopting Section 402); see also Slisze v.
Stanley-Bostitch, 979 P.2d 317,321 (Utah 1999) (recognizing "duty to warn against a
product's latent hazards that are known to the manufacturer"). Further, the trial court
looked for guidance to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals' decision in Florom v. Elliot
Mfg., 867 F.2d 570 (10th Cir. 1989), in which the federal appellate court upheld the
doctrine of successor liability for failure to warn. See R. at Farmers' Fed. App. 72-76
(citing additional case law supporting successor corporation independent duty to warn).
Under Utah's products liability law, Utah Code Ann. §78-15-6, an inadequate
warning regarding a product is one of three grounds for strict liability imposed on
manufacturers. See House v. Armour of America, Inc., 886 P.2d 542,547 (Utah 1994).
"[A] manufacturer who knows or should know of a risk associated with its product
may be directly liable to the user if it fails to warn adequately of the danger." Id.
(emphasis added).
In the context of successor liability, where a company purchases only the assets
of a corporation and yet also maintains a continuing relationship with the former
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corporation's customers, courts have imposed on the successor company the same duty
to warn of a product's defective or dangerous condition. See Florom, 879 F.2d 801,
802 (10th Cir. 1989) (per curiam); Florom v. Elliot Mfg., 867 F.2d at 576-77;
Schumacher v. Richards Shear Co., 451 N.E.2d 195, 199 (N.Y. 1983); Garcia, 933
P.2d at 250 ("a duty to warn arises when a relationship exists between him upon whom
the duty falls and a dangerous situation to be warned against."). Importantly, the duty
to warn is independent of any contractual or other relationship that the successor
corporation has with its predecessor: "The duty to warn is an independent duty not
determined by the contractual agreement between the predecessor-seller and
successor-buyer corporations''

879 F.2d at 802 (emphasis added) (quoting L.R.

Fumer, M.L Friedman, Products Liability, § 2.06 [5] (1988)); see also Garcia, 933
P.2d at 250. More particularly, "a duty arises only when there is a nexus between the
successor corporation, its predecessor's customers, and the allegedly defective product.
The key inquiry is whether there are sufficient facts to warrant an inference that the
successor corporation had actual or constructive notice of the alleged defect." Garcia,
933 P.2d at 250. Thus, "'a duty to warn arises when a relationship exists between him
upon whom the duty falls and the dangerous situation to be warned against.'" Id.
(emphasis added) (quoting Travis v. Harris Corp., 565 F.2d 443,449 (7th Cir. 1977));
see also Gee v. Tenneco, Inc., 615 F.2d 857, 866 (9th Cir.1980) ("[A] successor
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corporation may acquire an independent duty to warn where defects in a predecessor's
products come to its attention," particularly where there has been a "continuation of the
relationship between the successor and the customers of the successor.").
Utah law supports the adoption of an independent duty of a successor
corporation to warn of known product defects. Specifically, Utah has adopted the
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A, which includes the duty to warn. See Ernest
W. Hahn, Inc. v. Armco Steel Co., 601 P.2d 152,156-58 (Utah 1979) (adopting Section
402). Section 402 A recognizes three bases for strict products liability: "design defects,
manufacturing flaws, and inadequate warnings regarding use." House, 886 P.2d at
547, see also Utah Code Ann. §78-15-6 (inadequate warning as basis for product
liability). Under the facts of this case, there is no reason to justify a successor
corporation's failure to warn consumers of a known product defect.
The record evidence obtained from Metal Ware overwhelmingly demonstrates
that Metal Ware had both actual and constructive knowledge of the heating coil defect,
which was the issue of the USCPSC recall, and failed to provide any warnings of this
defect and ongoing danger to consumers. Following the April 1997 purchase of
American Harvest's assets, Metal Ware received numerous file cabinets and pallets of
documents directly related to the USCPSC recall of the FD-50 food dehydrators.
Included within these documents were two letters from the USCPSC imposing a
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continuing duty to maintain a corrective action program in regard to the defective
dehydrators and to notify the USCPSC of any further reports of product defects.
Further, Metal Ware's president, Wesley Drumm, testified repeatedly that he was well
aware of the product recall at the time that he purchased American Harvest's assets.
After the asset purchase was finalized, Metal Ware retained many of American
Harvest's key employees, including its founders, and also sent numerous letters to
American Harvest's former customers, retailers, distributors, and service centers
notifying of their intent to honor the warrantied and nonwarrantied repairs of American
Harvest dehydrators.
Thereafter, though nearly a year prior to the fire and substantial losses suffered
by the Tabors, Metal Ware received notice of a house fire in Oklahoma caused by an
American Harvest food dehydrator. Moreover, Metal Ware has maintained an ongoing
and undeniable relationship with many of American Harvest's customers, including
distributor Englewood and retailer Shopko, which continued to generate millions of
dollars in sales for Metal Ware. Nonetheless, despite their irrefutable pre-asset
purchase knowledge of the product defect and ongoing relationship with American
Harvest's customers, Metal Ware did absolutely nothing to warn said customers and,
ultimately, consumers like the Tabors of the danger associated with the product's use.
Thus, at all relevant times, Metal Ware maintained a direct relationship with the
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predecessor American Harvest's customers and assumed the responsibility of repairing
defects in American Harvest's products. See Garcia, 933 P.2d at 250. Metal Ware
was also on notice of the duty imposed by the USCPSC to continue a remedial action
program to address the product defect involved in the recall. Metal Ware had sample
recall packets with information directly aimed at contacting non-registered consumers.
Finally, Metal Ware had direct knowledge of the product defect involved in the recall,
including the defect's causing of a December 1997 house fire in Oklahoma, though did
absolutely nothing to warn consumers prior to the fire that destroyed the Tabors' home
in December 1998. See Garcia, 933 P.2d at 250; Travis, 565 F.2d at 449. For these
reasons, Metal Ware had a duty to warn.
1. FACTORS RELEVANT TO DETERMINING WHETHER METAL
DISCHARGED ITS DUTY TO WARN

WARE

Regardless of whether Metal Ware knew, or should have known of the Tabors'
existence, which is a fact question remaining in this matter, Metal Ware still had a duty
to make efforts to warn consumers, which Metal Ware failed to discharge. As
recognized in House v. Armour of America, Inc., "[a] manufacturer who knows or
should know of a risk associated with its product may be directly liable to the user if it
fails to warn adequately of the danger." 886 P.2d at 547 (emphasis added). Naturally,
the user of the product is the end consumer, like the Tabors. At all times, the key
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inquiry is whether there are sufficient facts to warrant an inference that the successor
corporation had actual or constructive notice of the alleged defect. Garcia, 933 P.2d at
250. Thus, as stated above, '"a duty to warn arises when a relationship exists between
him upon whom the duty falls and the dangerous situation to be warned against.'" Id.
{quoting Travis, 565 F.2d at 449).
Several courts have dismissed similar arguments to those advanced by Metal
Ware that a successor corporation has no duty to warn an end user where the end user
was purportedly unknown. For example, in Freeman v. United Cities Propane Gas,
807 F. Supp. 1533 (M.D. Ga. 1992), the court ruled:
Mobil and Petrolane argue that it did not have a practical and
effective means to warn Plaintiff about odor fade because it sold its
product in bulk. They had no containers in which to place warnings. See
Walkerv. Merck & Co., 648 F. Supp. 931, 934 (M.D. Ga. 1986). They
had no way of knowing who the ultimate consumer would be. In fact,
neither Mobil nor Petrolane had contact with the actual consumer.
The argument put forward by these Defendants ignores two very
easy alternatives that would have satisfied its duty to warn Mr. Freeman.
First, they could have contracted with the intermediary to require the
retailer to warn its consumer. See, e.g., Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories,
498F.2dl264,1116(5ihCix.)cert, denied, 419US. 1096,95 S.Ct. 687,
42 L.Ed.2d 688 (1974). In the alternative, they could have furnished
United Cities with a large warning sign that contained the necessary
information and instructed United Cities to place the sign in a
prominent place where the consumer would be sure to see it
What Mobil or Petrolane could have done is relevant, and
important, because the standard requires "no practical and effective
means" to warn. Stuckey, 874 F.2d at 1571 (emphasis added). All that
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Plaintiff must prove to prevail under this part of the instruction is the
existence of one alternative that is both practical and effective. The
evidence in the record is open to sufficiently differentinterpretationsto
create a genuine issue of material fact on this issue.
Id. at 1538. Similarly, in Khan v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 711 S.W. 2d 310 (Tex. App.
1986), the court recognized a manufacturer's duty to warn a retailer (Miss Phoebe)
extended to the ultimate consumer (Khan) where the manufacturer failed to adequately
warn the retailer:
We agree with the reasoning of the cited cases with respect to Velsicol's
duty to warn the Khans, as distinguished from a duty to warn Miss
Phoebe and its employees. The alleged defect in this case was not the
contents of the container but its label, which the Khans never saw and
would never have seen in the ordinary course of use of the product by
Miss Phoebe. Because Velsicol had no practicable method of warning
the Khans or giving them instructions concerning the safe use of the
product, the Khans1 claim must rest on a duty to provide adequate
warnings or instructions to Miss Phoebe. Velsicol cannot escape liability
to the Khans if itfailed to give adequate warnings or instructions to Miss
Phoebe. See Darryl v. Ford Motor Co., 440 S.W.2d 630 (Tex. 1969).
711 S.W.2d at 314 (emphasis added); cf Hiner v. Deere & Co., 340 P.2d 1191,1194
(1(T Cir. 2003) ("A plaintiffbringing a post-sale warning defect claim 'must make an
initial showing that the manufacturer acquired knowledge of a defect present but
unknown and unforeseeable at the point of sale and failed to take reasonable action to
warn of the defect.'" (Citation omitted.)) See also, R. at 10th Circuit Reply Brief of
Appellants Timothy A. and Debra J. Tabor and Farmers Insurance at 7-15 (discussing
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Plaintiffs reduced burden of proof in failure to warn cases).
Additionally, Utah has adopted the heeding presumption, under which the court
must assume that the Tabors would have adhered to any warning given by Metal
Ware/ See House, S86?.2d at 547; see also Colegrovev. Cameron Machine Co., Ill
F. Supp. 2d 611, 617 (W.D. Pa. 2001) ("To recover under § 402A, [a plaintiff] must
establish that the alleged defect was the proximate cause of his injuries."... However,
the plaintiff in a strict liability failure to warn case "is aided in making his case by a
rebuttable presumption that a warning, if given, would have been heeded."); Veloso v.
Western Bedding Supply Co., 281 F. Supp. 2d 743,748 (D. N.J. 2003) (recognizing the
heeding presumption "presumes that an individual would have followed an adequate
warning had such a warning been provided"); U.S. Silica Co. v. Tompkins, 92 S. W.3d
605, 608 (Tex. Ct. App. 2002) ("In the absence of a warning, a rebuttable presumption
arises that the user would have heeded the warning had one been provided."); see also
Nissen Trampoline Co. v. Terre Haute First Nat1'I Bank, 332N.E.2d 820,826 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1975) (holding the heeding presumption "would discourage those manufacturers
who would rather risk liability than provide a warning which would impair the

2

In Decius v. Action Collection Service, 105 P.3d 956,960 If 16 (Utah Ct. App. 2004),
the court also opined that "strict liability permits a plaintiff to forgo proving causation,
which is otherwise required in tort cases. The expansion of successor liability is in line
with that element of strict liability—a plaintiff does not need to prove that the
successor caused the injury."
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marketability of the product"), rev1 d on procedural grounds, 358 N.E.2d 974 (1976).
In House v. Armour of America, Inc., 929 P.2d at 347, the Utah Supreme Court
declared that a "heeding presumption... serves to reinforce the basic duty to warn—to
encourage manufacturers to produce safer products, and to alert users of the hazards
arising from the use of those products through effective warnings." The majority of
jurisdictions adopt a heeding presumption in products liability duty to warn cases. See,
e.g. Burton v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 397 F.3d 906,918 (10th Cir. 2005) (holding
under Kansas law, "An inadequate warning creates a presumption of causation."); Eck
v. Parke, Davis & Co., 256F.3d 1013,1018 (10th Cir. 2001)(holding under Oklahoma
law that "[w]here a consumer, whose injury the manufacturer should have reasonably
foreseen, is injured by a product sold without a required warning, a rebuttable
presumption will arise that the consumer would have read any warning provided by the
manufacturer, and acted so as to minimize the risks"); Tenbarge v. Ames Taping Tool
Sys., Inc., 190 F.3d 862, 866 (8th Cir. 1999) ("Under Missouri law, a rebuttable
presumption that adequate warnings would have been heeded arises if the plaintiff
shows that no warning was given.");i?/c/zterv. Limaxlnt'l, Inc., 45 F.3d 1464,1472
(10 Cir. 1995) (holding under Kansas law, where heeding presumption exists,
plaintiff does not have burden to demonstrate what warning would have been
effective). Even the comments to Restatement (Second) of Torts support for this
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position: "In order to prevent the product from being unreasonably dangerous, the
seller may be required to give directions or warning, on the container, as to its use
Where warning is given, the seller may reasonably assume that it will be read and
heeded." Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402(a), comment (j). The reverse
presumption then is also true—had Metal Ware given a warning, the Tabors would
have read such a notice and adhered to the same. Cf. House, 929 P.2d at 347
("[A]bsent adequate warnings, Lt. House may have felt more confident than he should
have and may have taken additional risks which, had he known the true limitations of
this vest, he would have minimized or avoided,").
In the context of a heeding presumption, "[t]o make a submissible case on
causation, the plaintiff must show that the product caused his injuries and that a
warning would have altered his behavior." Tenbarge, 190 F.3d at 866. There is no
requirement that the plaintiff demonstrate what type of warning would have been
adequate.
Of particular importance and relevance to Metal Ware's duty to warn the
Tabors, Metal Ware had in its possession, at all relevant times, packets which were
sent to American Harvest retailers of the FD-50 food dehydrators describing the
USCPSC consumer notification and remedial action plan and advising of the means
available to retailers to warn non-registered consumers of the products defects "with
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notices posted in retail stores and through the general media via a press release." See
R. atFarmers' Fed. App. 353 & id. at351-360. Thus, Metal Ware could have issued a
press release of posted notices in the retail stores in which the products were sold,
including Utah Shopko stores.
On that issue, Shopko's representative^ Shelly Schroeder, clearly indicated what
Shopko would have done had it received a proper warning from Metal Ware.
Specifically, Schroeder testified that Shopko would have followed its policies and
procedures established to handle any product recall. Namely, (1) there would have
been a meeting with counsel to discuss a plan of action in response to the warning
notice from Metal Ware,see R. at Farmers' Fed App. 236 (Schroeder Depo. at 44:420), (2) notice would have been given to consumers by means of posting signs in
Shopko's retail stores, see R. at Farmers' Fed App. 236-37 (Schroeder Depo. at App.
44:23 to 45:18 & 46:4-11), (3) notice would also have been posted at the customer
services desk and maintained for a period of 90 to 120 days, see R. at Farmers' Fed
App. 237 (Schroeder Depo. at 46:12-25), and, (4) given the severity of the risk
associated with the defective dehydrator, all remaining units would have been pulled
from Shopko's shelves, see R. atFarmers' Fed App. 237-38 (Schroeder Depo. at App.
49:22 to 50:7). Regardless, Metal Ware did nothing.
Despite Metal Ware's knowledge of the product recall, knowledge of the
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Oklahoma house fire, and knowledge of procedures directlyaimed at contacting end
users, Metal Ware did absolutely nothing to warn the Tabors of the defective
dehydrator. Indeed, the federal district court acknowledged that Metal Ware had ample
opportunity and means to give a warning via retail store posted notices, the media and
newspapers, and yet failed to do so:
Finally, Defendants knew that American Harvest had followed the
USCPSC's course of action to target end purchasers for whom neither
American Harvest nor its customers (retailers) had no record of purchase
and could not identify.... To inform these unidentified end purchasers
of the recall, American Harvest advised its customers to post notices
throughout their retail stores and "in the general media" such as "press
release[s]" and newspapers. Further Defendants knew that the USCPSA
"request[ed]" that American Harvest continue its corrective actions to
inform end purchasers until "as many products as possible have been
removed from the marketplace."
R. at Farmers' Fed. App. 76. Under these facts, regardless of the test imposed for
determining whether a manufacturer took reasonable steps to warn a consumer, Utah
law supports a finding that Metal Ware failed to discharge its duty to warn Englewood,
Shopko and the Tabors.
IX.

CONCLUSION
Under the facts of this case, Appellant Farmers Insurance Company respectfully

submits that Utah law should recognize the mere continuation, product line and
continuity of enterprise exceptions to the traditional rule of successor corporation non-
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liability. Moreover, Utah law does support an independent duty on a successor
corporation, regardless of the contractual relationship between the predecessor and
successor, in instances where the successor obtains knowledge of an ongoing danger of
the predecessor's product.
X.

STATEMENT IN SUPPORT OF ORAL ARGUMENT
This matter presents issues of first impression in the State of Utah in regard to

the duties of a successor corporation sounding in strict liability and a successor
corporation's independent duty to warn consumers of product defects. The litigation
has spanned six years and is fact intensive. For these reasons, Farmers Insurance
requests oral argument be scheduled in this matter.
XL

ADDENDUM NOT NECESSARY
No Addendum is necessary under Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(l 1).

XII. JOINDER IN TABORS' APPELLATE BRIEF
Pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 24(i), Appellant Farmers Insurance Company
hereby gives notice of its joinder in and adoption of the statements of fact and legal
arguments set forth in the brief filed by Timothy A. Tabor and Debra J. Tabor in this
matter.
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, on this 26th
day of September 2006

DUNN & DUNN, P.C.

JOHN/WARREN MAY/Esq
DUNN^fDUNN, P.C.

505 East 200 South, 2nd Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone: (801) 521-6666
Facsimile: (801) 521-9998
imav@dunndunn.com
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant
Farmers Insurance Company
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I, John Warren May, as legal counsel for Plaintiff-Appellant Farmers Insurance
Company, hereby certify that on September 26,20061 sent true and correct copies of
the foregoingBRIEF OF APPELLANT FARMERS INSURANCE COMPANY to the
following by the method indicated:
George T. Naegle, Esq.
Brian C. Webber, Esq.
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER &
NELSON

Key Bank Tower, Seventh Floor
50 South Main Street
P.O. Box 2465
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2465
Theodore E. Kanell, Esq.
PLANT, CHRISTENSEN & KANELL

136 East South Temple, Suite 1700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

(v^U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile (801-532-5506)
( ) E-Mail (brian-webber@rbmn.com)

(V)U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile (801-531-9747)
( ) E-Mail (tkanell@pwcklaw.com)
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DATED this 26-th
day of September 2006.

DUNN & DUNN, ?J£

JOHN WARREN MAY,
DUNN ^r DUNN, P.C.

505 East 200 South, 2nd Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone: (801) 521-6666
Facsimile: (801) 521-9998
i mav@dunndunn. com
Attorneys for Plaintiff Appellant
Farmers Insurance Company
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